Housing and Land Use—Eminent Domain and “Project Enhanced Value” by unknown
Urban Law Annual ; Journal of Urban and Contemporary Law
Volume 1973
January 1973
Housing and Land Use—Eminent Domain and
“Project Enhanced Value”
Follow this and additional works at: https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw
Part of the Law Commons
This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by the Law School at Washington University Open Scholarship. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Urban Law Annual ; Journal of Urban and Contemporary Law by an authorized administrator of Washington University Open Scholarship.
For more information, please contact digital@wumail.wustl.edu.
Recommended Citation




Advance publicity of proposed public improvement projects often
results in a general rise' in property values in the region of the an-
nounced project.2 Upon the ultimate taking for eminent domain
purposes, the question arises whether and to what extent such in-
creases in land value attributable to the potential project comprise
a proper element of the just compensation to be paid to the land-
owner.3 The Supreme Court of California in Merced Irrigation
District v. Woolstenhulme" interpreted the just compensation clause
of the California Constitution5 to permit consideration of the "proj-
ect enhanced value" which accrued to condemnee's property prior to
the time that it was reasonably probable that the property would be
taken for the improvement.
Defendant landowner in the instant case owned a ranch adjacent
to an artificial lake which had been created by plaintiff. Sometime
during the late 1950's, plaintiff formulated plans for a new water
project which, inter alia, would increase the size of the lake and pro-
vide recreational facilities such as fishing, boating and camping. The
trial court found that by January 1, 1963, the certainty of the poten-
tial project was general public knowledge and that the consequent
enhancement of neighboring lake property values had commenced,
despite the fact that the actual areas to be designated for recreational
purposes were as yet undetermined. By January 1, 1965, the project
had progressed to a point where it was reasonably probable6 that 189
1. This comment will be restricted to the effect of project enhancement on just
compensation. See generally, Note, Recovery for Enhancement and Blight in
California, 20 HASTINGS L.J. 622 (1969).
2. 4 P. NICHOLS, THE LAW OF EMINENT DoMAIN § 12.3151 (rev. ed. 1962)
[hereinafter cited as NICHOLS].
3. See generally Annot., 147 A.L.R. 66-103 (1943).
4. 4 Cal. 3d 478, 483 P.2d 1, 93 Cal. Rptr. 833 (1971).
5. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 14. "Private property shall not be taken or damaged
for public use without just compensation having first been made to, or paid into
court for, the owner .... " Id.
6. This was an arbitrary date set by the trial judge in applying a probability
standard to settle the dispute as to whether January 1, 1965, was the date at
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acres of defendant's landT would be taken for the project. Evidence
of comparable sales was admitted" and defendant was awarded $250
per acre.
On appeal, plaintiff objected to the trial court's valuation rulings
and sought to exclude from the computations that increment of
enhancement value attributable to the pending project. Secondly,
the Irrigation District asserted that the sales admitted into evidence
as comparable sales did not qualify as such under the California
Evidence Code.9
California law provides that private property shall not be taken
for eminent domain purposes without just compensation.10 Although
the measure of just compensation is not explicitly defined, the Code
of Civil Procedure establishes it as the actual value at the date of
the issuance of summons."' Actual value has, through judicial inter-
pretation, been held to be the market value.2 This term, defined as
which the inclusion of defendant's land became "definite" or just "reasonably
probable." 4 Cal. 3d at 485 n.3, 483 P.2d at 5 n.3, 93 Cal. Rptr. at 836 n.3.
7. The recreational aspect concerned only 72 of the 189 acres, the remaining
117 acres were known to have been included in the project long before 1965.
However, because of the difficulties posed for the jury in drawing this distinction,
both parties agreed to modification of the instruction to relate to the entire 189
acres. Id. at 485 n.4, 483 P.2d at 5 n.4, 93 Cal. Rptr. at 837 n.4.
8. Pre-improvement land sales brought a maximum of $125 per acre, while
post-1965 sale prices ranged from $250 to $600 per acre. Id. at 485, 483 P.2d at
5, 93 Cal. Rptr. at 837.
9. CAL. EvD. CODE § 816 (Deering 1967):
When relevant to the determination of the value of property, a witness may
take into account as a basis for his opinion the price and other terms and
circumstances of any sale or contract to sell and purchase comparable prop-
erty if the sale or contract was freely made in good faith within a reasonable
time before or after the date of valuation. In order to be considered com-
parable, the sale or contract must have been made sufficiently near in time
to date of valuation, and the property sold must be located sufficiently near
the property being valued, and must be sufficiently alike in respect to char-
acter, size, situation, useability [sic], and improvements, to make it clear that
the property sold and the property being valued are comparable in value and
that the price realized for the property sold may be fairly considered as
shedding light on the value of the property being valued.
10. CAL. CONSr. art. I, § 14.
11. CAL. Crv. PRO. CODE § 1249 (Deering 1967). However, if there is a delay
in excess of one year not caused by the condemnee, the value will be assessed as of
the trial date. Id.
12. See 4 NicHoLs § 12.1. E.g., People v. Al G. Smith Co., 86 Cal. App. 2d
308, 311, 194 P.2d 750, 753 (1948).
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the highest price estimated in terms of money which the land
would bring if exposed for sale in the open market, with reason-
able time allowed in which to find a purchaser, buying with
knowledge of all of the uses and purposes to which it was
adapted and for which it was capable' 3
has, with slight variations, been generally accepted as the standard.",
The market value is to be determined in view of all the facts which
would naturally affect its value in the minds of purchasers gen-
erally,- e.g., the character of the neighborhood.16 Inherent in the
attributes of the neighborhood would be the bona fide expectancy of
being located in the proximity of the improvement. It follows
logically, therefore, that project enhanced value should be considered
a valid component of market value.17
This superficially unambiguous standard must, however, be re-
examined in light of a long line of California cases whose dicta sug-
gest that any rise in value before the taking which is caused by the
expectation of that event is disallowed in computing just compensa-
tion.' Thus, the Merced court was forced to elucidate further the
concept of project enhanced value in an effort to reconcile its earlier
decisions. A trilogy of types of project enhanced value was enumer-
ated. They were, briefly, that augmentation of land values can be
expected where:
(1) there is probable or certain inclusion of the land within the
scope of the project;
(2) there is speculation based upon the imminence of taking;
and
13. Sacramento So. R.R. v. Heilbron, 156 Cal. 408, 409, 104 P. 979, 980
(1909).
14. See 4 NICHOLS § 12.211]. See also 1 L. ORGEL, VALUATION UNDER .sMI-
NrNT DOMAIN § 17, at 79 (2d ed. 1953).
15. Spring Valley Water Works v. Drinkhouse, 92 Cal. 528, 533, 28 P. 681,
683 (1891).
16. 4 Cal. 3d at 483, 483 P.2d at 7, 93 Cal. Rptr. at 839.
17. Id. at 492, 483 P.2d at 10, 93 Cal. Rptr. at 842.
18. E q., People ex rel. Dep't of Pub. Works v. Shasta Pipe, 264 Cal. App. 2d
520, 539, 70 Cal. Rptr. 618, 630 (19683): People ex rel. Dep't of Water Resources
v. Brown, 255 Cal. App. 2d 597, 599, 63 Cal. Rptr. 363, 364 (1967); Community
Rode'.'. Agency v. Henderson, 251 Cal. App. 2d 336, 343, 59 Cal. Rptr. 311, 315
(1967); County of Los Angeles v. Hoe, 138 Cal. App. 2d 74, 78, 291 P.2d 98,
100 (1955); City of Pasadena v. Union Trust Co., 138 Cal. App. 21, 26, 31 P.2d
463, 466 (1934).
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(3) property which is expected to remain outside the develop-
ment is subsequently taken.19
Reconciliation of the Merced holding with past controlling deci-
sions was made on the basis of these distinctions. The fountainhead
of the California position for cases in the first classification is San
Diego Land & Town Co. v. Neale,2o which held that "it seems mon-
strous to say that the benefit arising from the proposed improvement
is to be taken into consideration as an element of the value of the
land."21 Taken in context, the benefit referred to in Neale is the
increase in value which a condemned tract gains when valued as part
of the proposed project.22 Clearly, that incremental value is one
which should never be considered a legitimate element of just com-
pensation since compensation is based on the loss imposed on the
owner, not on the benefit received by the taker.23 Likewise, the
exclusion of enhancement value is proper in situations which fall
within the second aspect noted above, where property value increases
are based on a purchaser's conjecture of what the condemnor could
be compelled to pay.24 Otherwise, the speculator would effectively be
allowed to set just compensation through his own purchase price.2
The third category, however, is distinguishable from the other two
in that it encompasses factual situations like Merced where the gain
results from the expectation that the land will not be taken, and
thus will enjoy the benefits of the proposed improvement. Here, the
project enhanced value which accrued prior to the time when it
became probable that the land would be needed for the improve-
ment is properly included in computing the market value20 since
proximity to the project is a factor which would be considered by a
prospective purchaser.2 7
In so resolving the issue, the court essentially adopted the standard
19. 4 Cal. 3d at 490, 483 P.2d at 8, 93 Cal. Rptr. at 840.
20. 78 Cal. 63, 20 P. 372 (1888).
21. Id. at 75, 20 P. at 377.
22. 4 Cal. 3d at 491, 483 P.2d at 9, 93 Cal. Rptr. at 840.
23. United States v. Chandler-Dunbar Co., 229 U.S. 53, 81 (1913).
24. United States v. Miller, 317 U.S. 369, 377 (1943).
25. 1 L. ORGEL, supra note 14, § 83 at 358.
26. 317 U.S. at 376.
27. People ex rel. Dep't of Pub. Works v. Donovan, 57 Cal. 2d 346, 352, 369
P.2d 1, 4, 19 Cal. Rptr. 473, 476 (1962).
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of probable inclusion set forth by the United States Supreme Court
in United States v. Miller28 and subsequently adopted by the major-
ity of jurisdictions.29 Basically, the doctrine of probable inclusion
provides that property owners whose lands were probably within the
scope of the project from the time the condemning authority became
committed to it will not be compensated for enhancement value. If,
however, it was anticipated that the lands would be adjacent to the
project, subsequent enlargement of the project to include them
should not deprive the landowner of value added in the meantime
by the proximity of the improvement.30
Under this standard, California courts now face the practical prob-
lem of defining the requisite "certainty of inclusion" that is required
before project enhanced value should be excluded from just compen-
sation computations. The task of segregating those cases in which
enhancement should be compensable from those in which it should
not will be minimized by utilization of the Miller formula which ex-
cludes project enhanced value whenever the court concludes that an
informed owner could have reasonably anticipated that his land might
be taken for the project. 31 Adoption of this doctrine by the Supreme
Court of California exhibits judicial awareness of the sensitivity of
property values to public actions.32 It is an equitable compromise
between strict adherence to the general rule which excludes all en-
hancement value attributable to the project and promulgation of an
exception to that rule which would allow all enhancement value due
to proximity to a definitely planned improvement which had accrued
up to the date of actual taking.33
Difficulties regarding the valuation of properties acquired for pub-
lic improvement projects are further aggrandized by evidentiary
problems. Criteria concerning the admissibility into evidence of
similar sales as set forth in section 816 of the California Evidence
Code34 and adopted by the courts require that:
28. 317 U.S. at 377.
29. See 4 NicHOLS § 12.315112].
30. 317 U.S. at 377.
31. Id.
32. D. MANDELKER, MANAGING OUR URBAN ENVIRONMENT 587 (2d ed. 1971).
33. But see 8 H. KALTENBACH, SUPPLEMENT TO JUST COMPENSATION 11
(1971).
34. See note 9 supra.
35. County of Los Angeles v. Faus, 48 Cal. 2d 672, 678, 312 P.2d 680, 684
(1957). The requirement of size was not included as a factor of comparability
since the case was decided prior to the enactment of § 816.
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(1) the comparable sales have been made freely and in good
faith reasonably near in time to the date of variation;
(2) the property sold be located sufficiently near the property
being valued; and
(3) the properties be similar in character, size, situation, us-
ability and improvements.38
Given the unique character of real estate, this becomes a rather
vague norm for comparability37 Consequently, the trial court has
been afforded wide discretion regarding the degree of similarity nec-
essary to make sales comparable and admissible as evidence.'8 Gen-
erally, the feeling of the court is that such evidence should not be
excluded if there is some foundation for it.30 The weight to be given
it is a factual situation to be considered-or even ignored-by the
jury.40 Following this trend, the court in Merced permitted defend-
ant's expert appraisal witness to support his valuation of $600 per
acre4l by offering evidence of 1965 and 1966 sales of neighboring
parcels. In contrast to the pre-improvement sale price of $125 per
acre, the later sales prices ranged from $250 to $600 per acre. The
instant court felt, however, that the sales, though subsequent to Jan-
uary 1, 1965, and reflecting substantial enhancement, could be con-
sidered as "shedding light"42 on the value of the condemned prop-
erty. Furthermore, there existed other factors, such as zoning changes
and freeway construction, to which at least a portion of the enhance-
ment could possibly have been attributed,43 and it is exceedingly
difficult to isolate fluctuations in property values that are attributa-
ble to the project from fluctuations in value attributable to market
36. See generally Comment, Admissibility of Evidence of Comparable Sales to
Determine Market Value of Urban Renewal Property, 1969 URBAN L. ANN. 176.
37. 5 NicsHo.s § 21.3[1].
38. United States v. Reynolds, 397 U.S. 14, 20 (1970); County of Los Angeles
v. Faus, 48 Cal. 2d 672, 678, 312 P.2d 680, 684 (1957).
39. People ex rel. Dep't of Pub. Works v. University Hill Foundation, 188 Cal.
App. 2d 327, 332, 10 Cal. Rptr. 437, 440 (1961).
40. Id.; People ex rel. Dep't of Pub. Works v. Reardon, 4 Cal. 3d 507, 512, 483
P.2d 20, 25, 93 Cal. Rptr. 852, 855 (1971).
41. Having examined 1965 and 1966 sales of neighborhood parcels, defendant's
expert appraisal witness evaluated defendant's land at $600 per acre after deduct-
ing $50 per acre for enhanced value arising from the lake project. 4 Cal. 3d at
486, 483 P.2d at 5, 93 Cal. Rptr. at 837.
42. See note 9 supra.
43. 4 Cal. 3d at 501, 483 P.2d at 16, 93 Cal. Rptr. at 848.
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causes unrelated to the project.4 4 An instruction was given to the
jury to eliminate any enhancement value which they found arose as
a result of public knowledge of the project after January 1, 1965. 4 5
Exclusion of the comparable sales would have deprived the jury of
objective market evidence. 46
Merced further extended the boundaries of the court's discretion
by interpreting section 822 (d) of the California Evidence Code47 as
not precluding an appraiser's testimony relating to adjustments that
must be made in the comparable sale price to utilize that sale as an
indicant of the value of the condemned property. That an appraiser's
explanation of any relevant differences which he has taken into
account in inferring the value of the subject land from that of the
comparable parcel is useful to the jury in weighing the evidence is
without question. The Merced court, however, went a step further
by holding that an expert appraiser is permitted to isolate the
amount of the comparable sale figure which he ascribes to such
adjustments. (The adjustment in the case at hand was for project
enhancement.) The validity of such a holding is debatable for two
principal reasons.
First, it usurps the jury's function of ascertaining market value. In
eminent domain litigation, once the judge has made the preliminary
determination that the proffered sale is sufficiently comparable to
shed light on the value of the subject land, the evidence is sent to the
jury for consideration. Accordingly, it should be for the jury to
decide what portion of the proffered sale price can be imputed to
factors such as enhancement value. s Furthermore, the jury can
intelligently determine the weight to be accorded an appraiser's
44. See notes 32 & 33 supra.
45. 4 Cal. 3d at 487, 483 P.2d at 6, 93 Cal. Rptr. at 838.
46. CALIFORNIA LAw RE iSION CO-M'N, RECOlMENDATIONS AND STUDY RE-
LATING TO EVIDENCE IN EMINENT DOMAIN PROCEEDINGS, at A-32 (1960).
47. CAL. EVID. CODE § 822 (Deering 1967):
Notwithstanding the provisions of §§ 814 to 821, the following matter is
inadmissible as evidence and is not a proper basis for an opinion as to the
value of the property:
(d) an opinion as to the value of any property or property interest other
than that being valued.
48. In a subsequent case, instruction was given to the jury to disregard the
comparable sales price to the extent that it reflected project enhanced value.
County of San Luis Obispo v. Bailey, 4 Cal. 3d 518, 524, 483 P.2d 27, 31, 93
Cal. Rptr. 859, 863 (1971).
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opinion by considering both the comparable sale price and the
reasons for his opinion.
Second, it violates section 822 (d) of the Evidence Code which bars
the admission of opinions as to the value of any property or prop-
erty interest other than the one being valued.40 To permit an
appraiser to testify that he has assigned a specific sum to account for
variances between two properties would be tantamount to admitting
his opinion as to the value of the comparable parcel. He would, in
effect, be testifying that the value of the comparable parcel was the
sale price less the amount he designated to explain any adjustments.
Thus, the court's failure to distinguish between an explanation of
property differences and the assignment of a monetary value to those
differences undermines the policy considerations of section 822 (d),
which are essentially to avoid collateral issues and the consequent
prolongation of eminent domain trials which would arise if appraisers
were permitted to testify as to their opinions of the value of other
property.50 The court's ruling appears to render the section 822 (d)
exception virtually ineffectual since an appraiser's opinion as to the
value of property other than that being valued will now be admissible
under the guise of an explanation.
The overall effect of the Merced court's disposition of the eviden-
tiary problem is to compound the uncertainties 1 already prevalent
in condemnation proceedings and to thwart a commendable effort by
the California legislature to eliminate some of those uncertainties by
means of codification. This inducement for future litigation, how-
ever, is overshadowed by the court's resolution of the just compensa-
tion dilemma. The courts, in making future decisions, will be aided
by the guidelines established in Merced for the inclusion of project
enhanced value in just compensation computations:62 where
enhancement occurs because the property is known to be within the
project or where condemnation is expected, it must be excluded;
where it arises due to potential adjacency coupled with private own-
ership, it is included.
Janice Kromrey Corr
49. See note 47 supra.
50. CALIFORNIA LAW REVISION COMM'N, supra note 46, at A-8.
51. Id. at A-5.
52. These guidelines were followed in People ex rel. Dep't of Pub. Works v.
Reardon, 4 Cal. 3d 507, 511, 483 P.2d 20, 22, 93 Cal. Rptr. 852, 854 (1971).
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